Recenzje
From Mind to Body and Back. Janet Levin, The Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge Elements in Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, New York 2022, pp. 72.
Opublikowane 08.09.2022 — zaktualizowane 21.12.2022
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Jak cytować
Jakha H., From Mind to Body and Back. Janet Levin, The Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge Elements in Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, New York 2022, pp. 72., Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy, 2022, t. 19, nr 2, s. 255-275, https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2022.19.2.201
Prawa autorskie (c) 2022 Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy
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